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Abstract. According to a traditional line  of   interpretation,   Plato’s   introduction  of   the   three-part 
soul in Republic 4 was motivated in part by his desire to acknowledge and account for cases of 
akratic action, and thereby to repudiate the psychology and the conclusions of the earlier dialogue 
Protagoras. In this paper I reject this interpretation, arguing that countenancing akrasia was 
never a major philosophical concern for Plato, and a fortiori that it was not his motivation for 
introducing the tripartite soul. I argue that his moral psychological focus and concern in the 
Republic was rather on the notion of psychic rule, and on illuminating various ways in which 
reasoning is corrupted by non-rational desires (rather than overcome by them through brute 
psychic   ‘force’).   I   then   offer   an   explanation   of   Plato’s   evident lack of concern for akrasia by 
appealing to the Protagoras itself. I conclude with a rejection of sharp developmentalism between 
the two dialogues.  
 
 
 
A prevalent line of interpretation makes akrasia a centerpiece of Platonic moral 
psychology: in earlier dialogues, notably Protagoras, this interpretation has it, Plato 
presents an ‘intellectualist’ account of the soul that is distinguished in large part by its 
denial of the possibility of akrasia. The Protagoras denies, that is, that is possible for an 
agent, under the influence of pleasure, pain, fear, or the like, to act contrary to her better 
judgment about what she ought to do (provided she continues to maintain that judgment 
at the time of action). All putative cases of akrasia, the Protagoras claims, are in fact 
cases of ignorance. However, Plato later came to accept the possibility of akrasia, and in 
the Republic he introduces a new tripartite theory of the soul that is intended to 
accommodate its possibility and repudiate the psychology of the Protagoras.1 According 
to this reading, Plato’s  theory  of  tripartition was introduced largely because Plato wanted 
to   explain   akratic   action.   Reeve   states   this   view   succinctly:   referring   to   Socrates’  
argument of the Protagoras, he comments,  “It cannot be reasonably doubted, in my view, 
that Plato developed the tripartite psychology of the Republic in response to this 
                                                 
1 An alternative version of this line of interpretation is that the Protagoras presents a distinctively 
Socratic moral psychology, and that Plato develops the tripartite theory of the soul as a rejection 
of the Socratic view and its denial of akrasia.  
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argument.”2 On the prevalent interpretation, then, considerations about akratic action 
motivate tripartite theory, and akrasia assumes a place of great importance in Platonic 
moral  psychology  and  the  development  of  Plato’s thought.3 
 I would like to raise doubts about this picture. According to my alternative 
interpretation, Plato introduces the theory of tripartition in order to provide the resources 
for illuminating his understanding of psychic rule. While many commentators may accept 
that psychic rule is a priority (perhaps even a main priority) for Plato, however, my view 
is somewhat stronger. In particular, I will argue that recognizing and explaining the 
possibility of akrasia was not any part   of   Plato’s   motivation   for   introducing   tripartite  
theory, and that in fact he systematically avoids countenancing cases of akrasia in the 
Republic.4 Here it is important to note that, for the purposes of this paper, I restrict use of 
                                                 
2 1988: 134. 
3 Those who advocate versions of the prevalent interpretation include: Bobonich 1994: 3, 5; 2002: 
219-47; and 2007: 41-2, 51; Brickhouse and Smith 2007: 16-7 and 2010: 200; Cooper 1999a: 74-
5; Dorion 2007: 125-6 and 2012: 37-8, 48-9; Frede 1992; Gardner 2002: 200, 203; Gill 1985: 6; 
Gosling 1990: 20-1; Irwin 1977: 191-5 and 1995: 209-11; Lesses 1987: 148 and 1990: 144; 
Lorenz 2006: 147-8; Miller 1999: 96; Penner 1971:103 and 1990: 49-61; Reeve 1988: 134-5; and 
Rowe 2003 and 2007: 25. Dorion (2012: 37-8), for example, who discusses both akrasia and 
enkrateia in  connection  with  tripartite  psychology,  comments,  “In  light  of  the  partition  of  the  soul  
in the Republic, Socrates there recognizes explicitly what he refuses to admit in the Protagoras, 
viz. not only that there can be conflict between reason and desire, but equally that it is possible to 
be  overcome  by  the  latter.”  Gosling  (1990:  22)  remarks:  “For  the  later  Plato,  therefore,  there  is  no  
general problem about weakness of will: it occurs as the ordinary person of the Protagoras says it 
does.”  Finally,  Lorenz  (2006:  147)  writes,  “On  the  Protagoras’  picture  […]  no  emotion  can  ever  
get a person to act against what they believe is best as long as they maintain that belief. This, I 
think,   is   a   rather   implausible   view   […]   It   is   emphatically   rejected   by   the  Republic’s   theory   of  
motivation.”   
4 Others who (on a wide variety of grounds) reject, or express reservations about, the prevalent 
interpretation include: Carone 2001; Ferrari 1990: 139 and 2007: 168-9; Kahn 1996: 243-57; 
Morris 2006; Shields 2001: 139 and 2007: 82-3, 86; Singpurwalla 2006: 243, 254-5; Stalley 
2007: 80-3; Weiss 2006: 169-70, 180-1; and Whiting 2012: 175. Some interpreters, such as 
Carone, Morris, and Singpurwalla reject the developmentalism inherent in (many versions of) the 
prevalent interpretation, while nonetheless evidently accepting that akrasia was a central 
psychological concern for Plato. Others such as Weiss accept developmentalism but reject the 
idea that akrasia was a major motivation for the perceived shift in Platonic moral psychology. 
Ferrari, Kahn, Shields, Whiting, and (perhaps) Stalley all reject both developmentalism and the 
centrality of akrasia in   Plato’s   moral   psychology. Kahn (1996: 256-57), however, rejects 
developmentalism not because he takes Plato to be committed to a denial of akrasia in the 
Republic, but because he takes Plato never to have been committed to denying akrasia in the first 
place. I take my interpretation of the Republic to be allied on many key points with that of 
Carone, although there are some crucial differences between our two accounts: (a) she takes 
akrasia to be a central issue in Platonic moral psychology, whereas my central thesis is that it is 
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‘akrasia’   to  cases  in  which  an  agent  performs  some  action  while  believing,  and  despite  
believing, that she should do otherwise—that   is,   to  cases   in  which  an  agent’s  appetites  
‘force’   her   to   act   against   her   concurrently held better judgment (rather than, say, by 
causing her to vacillate in that judgment).  
I will begin by arguing, in §1 and §2, that tripartite theory is not concerned with 
explaining akratic action, but rather with providing the resources to elucidate the notion 
of psychic control or rule. As I will show in §3, however, psychic control or rule—even 
when it is exercised by the inferior appetitive element in the soul—is not understood on 
the model of akrasia. As the Republic presents it, appetite does not exercise control over 
an  agent’s  soul by forcing the agent to act against her better judgment, but rather by, in 
various ways, corrupting the  agent’s reasoning and judgment. One of the primary aims of 
my paper, then—in addition to challenging the view that acknowledging akrasia is a 
motivation for tripartite psychology—is to contribute a careful analysis of Plato’s  
presentation and understanding of self-mastery and psychic rule in the Republic. In §4 I 
will offer an account of why Plato was primarily concerned with psychic rule. Drawing 
on the Protagoras and Phaedo, I will suggest that the answer has much to do with what 
Plato  finds  ‘ridiculous’ or  ‘strange’ about  the  many’s  understanding of akrasia. Finally, 
in §5, I will address the issue of developmentalism. If my account is correct, then there 
may be much more continuity between the moral psychology of Protagoras and Republic 
than is typically thought.  
 
1. Akrasia in the Republic 
 
  There are at least three initial reasons for doubting the view that Plato introduces 
tripartite psychology in order to recognize and explain the phenomenon of akrasia. First, 
as some commentators have previously noted, tripartition of the soul is not necessary for 
                                                                                                                                                 
not; (b) she is insistent that the Republic is committed to denying the possibility of akrasia, 
whereas my own conclusions are somewhat weaker; and (c) her account turns on the question 
whether   appetites   and   emotions   are   ‘good-dependent’   or   ‘good-independent’   in   the   Republic, 
whereas nothing in my account depends on that issue. (See n. 44 for more on the good-dependent 
or -independent status of appetites.) 
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countenancing akrasia. 5  If   Plato’s   primary   concern   had   been   to   account   for   akratic  
behavior, then he evidently would have needed at most a two-part division of the soul: a 
rational part that judges and desires what is best, and a non-rational part responsible for 
passions that pull against reason’s desires.6 Given the hypothesis that tripartition aims to 
account for akrasia, the  ‘third’ part of the soul becomes explanatorily idle.7 This suggests 
that the developmentalist picture is at the very least not telling the whole story, and that 
even if accounting for akrasia was part of the motivation for the theory of tripartition, it 
was not the sole or primary motivation for it. 
 A second point, however, suggests that accounting for akrasia was not even part 
of the motivation for tripartite psychology. In the Republic 4 argument for tripartition, 
Socrates distinguishes the three parts of the soul from one another by appealing to the 
phenomenon of psychic conflict: first, conflict between reason and appetite; second, 
between appetite and spirit; and third, between spirit and reason. Yet in the three cases of 
conflict that he cites, Socrates avoids explicitly recognizing a case of akrasia.8 Consider 
first his argument for a division between the reasoning and appetitive parts of the soul. 
Socrates comments:  “Now, would we assert that sometimes there are thirsty people who 
are unwilling to drink? [...] What,  then,  should  one  say  about  them?  Isn’t  it  that  there  is  
something in their soul, bidding them to drink, and something different, forbidding them 
to do so, that masters the thing that bids?” (439c2-7).9 Socrates makes it clear that this 
conflict between reason and appetite does not result in akratic behavior: the thirsty 
individuals are unwilling (οὐκ ἐθέλειν) to drink because the reasoning part of their souls 
‘masters’ (κρατοῦν) the appetitive part. Likewise, when Socrates argues for the 
                                                 
5 This point is noted in Dorion 2012: 36; as well as in Shields 2001: 139 and 2007: 77.  
6  Nor is tripartition sufficient for countenancing akratic action: one may think that desires 
originate in three different parts of the soul, but that nonetheless (for one reason or another), 
agents always act in accordance with their judgments of goodness. Carone (2001: 133-4) 
advocates such an interpretation. Cf. Stalley 2007: 81. 
7  Precisely   this   point   has   been   taken   by   some   commentators   as   evidence   that   Plato’s   real 
commitment, despite the appearance given by Republic 4, was to a merely bipartite division of 
the soul. See Penner 1971: 111-3, Rees 1957, and Robinson 1995: 44-6, as well as replies in 
Moss 2005 and Miller, Jr. 1999: 99. 
8 A point noted in Stalley 2007: 80. 
9 Translations of Plato are from Cooper 1997, with modifications. 
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distinction between the reasoning and spirited parts of the soul, he appeals to the case of 
Odysseus, who   “struck his breast and spoke to his heart” in order to quell his spirited 
anger.  “Here”,  Socrates  explains,  “Homer clearly represents the part that has calculated 
about better and worse as different from the part that is angry without calculation” 
(441b6-c2). Although Socrates himself does not explicitly indicate whether reason or 
anger ultimately prevails in this conflict, reason’s   victory   is   nonetheless   clear: in the 
quoted passage from Homer, Odysseus does not rashly retaliate against the insolent 
suitors and maidservants, but instead patiently waits to carry out his plan for a more 
glorious revenge. Odysseus, like the thirsty individuals, does not act akratically. 
 The case of Leontius, to which Socrates appeals to illustrate the conflict between 
appetite and spirit, is more complicated. According to the story Socrates has heard, 
Leontius was once walking up from the Piraeus when he saw some corpses lying by the 
public executioner: 
He had an appetite to look at them but at the same time he was disgusted and turned 
away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face, but, finally, 
overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open and rushed towards the 
corpses, saying,  ‘Look  for  yourselves,  you  evil  wretches,  take  your  fill  of  the  admirable  
sight!’[…] [That story] certain proves that anger sometimes makes war against the 
appetites as one thing against another (439e9-440a6). 
 
Leontius is often taken to be the Republic’s   paradigmatic exemplar of akratic 
behavior,10 and there is some prima facie justification for this reading. Unlike the two 
previous cases, in Leontius we have a clear instance of an agent acting in accordance with 
a recalcitrant non-rational impulse:  he  is  ‘overpowered’  (κρατούμενος) by his appetite. 
However, this does not yet make it a case of akrasia, because what we do not have is any 
explicit indication that, when Leontius acts on his appetitive desire, he is at the same time 
acting against his rational judgment. The only psychic factors Socrates explicitly cites are 
appetite on the one hand and anger on the other.11 Of course, Socrates also does not deny 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Bobonich 1994: 7; Brickhouse and Smith 2007: 16; Cooper 1999b: 128; 
Dorion 2012: 38, n. 20; Gardner 2002: 200; Gosling 1990: 21; Irwin 1977: 192; Kahn 254-5; 
Lesses 1987: 148; and Reeve 1988: 134. 
11 Crombie  (1962:  346)  comments:  “Rational  calculation  perhaps has nothing to say on the topic 
of corpse-viewing. Even if it does in fact condemn it, the more relevant point is that the morbid 
appetite is also opposed by non-rational attitude of disgust”. 
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that Leontius acts against a rational judgment when he gazes at the corpses, and many 
commentators have found it natural to suppose that Leontius does act against such a 
judgment. 12  This reading seems to receive support from the comments that follow. 
Socrates continues,   “Besides,   don’t   we   often   notice   in   other   cases   that   when   appetite  
forces someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and gets angry 
with  that  in  him  that’s  doing  the  forcing,  so  that  of  the  two  factions  that  are  fighting  in  a  
civil war, so to speak, spirit  allies  itself  with  reason?” (440a8-b4).13 On the surface, this 
remark seems to acknowledge that appetites sometimes  ‘force’  agents to act akratically 
against their better judgment. If that is correct, and if we are supposed to read this 
comment back into the preceding case of Leontius, then Leontius’   corpse-gazing does 
turn out to be an instance of akrasia. 
I will return to this important passage later in the paper. For now, it is enough to 
note that even if the remarks at 440a-b do imply that Leontius acts akratically, Socrates 
himself avoids bringing that implication to the surface when he describes the case. That, 
in itself, is sufficient to undermine the prevalent view. If, as the developmentalist picture 
claims, tripartition is introduced in order to countenance and explain akratic behavior, 
then we would expect Plato to make a clear, unambiguous case of akrasia the focal point 
of his discussion. Instead, he systematically avoids doing so: in the two cases in Book 4 
in which he makes it explicit that reasoning is involved in a psychic conflict, reasoning 
prevails; and in the one case in which a non-rational impulse prevails, Plato does not 
make it explicit that reasoning is involved at all. In other words, precisely when Plato has 
the opportunity to recognize the possibility of akratic action and repudiate the 
conclusions of the Protagoras (and precisely when, on the prevalent view, that is one of 
his primary objectives), he does not. 
For the final preliminary consideration against the prevalent view, we should 
begin by noting that in the Protagoras, Plato uses  ‘weaker  than’  locutions  to  characterize  
the many’s  position  on  akrasia. Individuals act contrary to what they know is best, the 
                                                 
12 E.g.  Rowe  2003:  27:  “Leontius  […]  quite  clearly  does  not  think it a good thing to feast his eyes 
on  dead  bodies,  even  while  he  is  doing  it.” 
13 Brickhouse and Smith 2010: 208-9 take these remarks to be decisive on the question whether 
Leontius is an akratic. See further discussion in §4 and n. 40. 
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many  claim,  because   they  are   ‘weaker   than  pleasure’   (ἡδονῆς ἥττω)  or   ‘weaker   than  
themselves’  (ἥττω ἑαυτοῦ),14 and it is this understanding of akrasia in terms of being 
‘weaker   than’   that   Socrates   confronts   and   ultimately   rejects. If tripartition had been 
introduced in order to vindicate  the  many’s position and countenance akratic action, then 
we   would   expect   these   distinctive   ‘weaker   than’   expressions   to   be   prominent   in   the  
Republic’s  treatment of the tripartite soul. Yet they are not. In fact, they appear nowhere 
in the crucial Book 4 argument for the division of the soul, nor does Plato make any use 
of them in the remainder of the dialogue following Book 4. The significance of this point 
becomes amplified when we note that Plato does, in fact, provide an analysis of the 
expression  ‘being  weaker   than  oneself’   in   the  Republic, but that he does so at 430e ff., 
prior to his introduction of tripartition. Again, if tripartite psychology is supposed to 
provide the resources for repudiating the Protagoras’  denial  of  akrasia, then it is unclear 
why   Plato   would   have   revisited   the   notion   of   ‘being   weaker   than   oneself’   before 
introducing the tripartite soul and ignored that notion after introducing it. 
 
2. ‘Being  Weaker  than  Oneself’ 
 
So much for preliminaries. The main case against the prevalent view can be 
constructed through a closer examination of the passage just referred to: the Republic’s  
treatment  of  ‘being  weaker  than  oneself’  at  430e  ff.  The  passage  will  prove  important  in  
what follows, so I quote it at some length: 
<Soc.> Moderation is surely a kind of order [κόσμος], the control [ἐγκράτεια] of 
certain kinds of pleasures and desires. People indicate as much when they use the phrase 
‘being  stronger  than  oneself’  and  similar  phrases.   I  don’t  know  just  what   they  mean  by  
them, but they are, so to speak, like tracks or clues that moderation has left behind in 
language.  Isn’t  that  so? 
<Gl.> Absolutely. 
<Soc.> Yet  isn’t  the  expression  ‘being  stronger  than  oneself’  ridiculous?  The  self  that  is  
‘stronger’  is  the  same  as  the  self  that  is  ‘weaker’,  so that the same person is referred to in 
all such expressions. 
<Gl.> Of course. 
<Soc.>  Nonetheless, the expression is apparently trying to indicate that, in the soul of 
that very person, there is something better and something worse, and that, whenever what 
                                                 
14 For examples, see 352d8-e1; 353a1, c2; 354e7; 355c3, d6, e2; 357e2; 358c2-3. 
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is naturally better is in control of [ἐγκρατές] what is worse, this is expressed by saying 
that  the  person  is  ‘stronger  than  himself’.  At  any  rate,  this  expression  is  a  kind  of  praise.  
But when, on the other hand, what is smaller and better is mastered [κρατῃθῇ] by what 
is  larger  and  worse,  due  to  poor  upbringing  or  bad  company,  this  is  called  being  ‘weaker  
than  oneself’  and  licentious,  and  it  is  a  kind  of  reproach. 
<Gl.> Appropriately so. 
<Soc.> Take  a  look  at  our  new  city,  and  you’ll  find  one  of  these conditions in  it.  You’ll  
say  that  it  is  rightly  called  ‘stronger  than  itself’,  if  indeed  something  in  which  the  better  
rules [ἄρχει] the worse is properly called moderate and ‘stronger  than  itself’ […] If any 
city  is  said  to  be  ‘stronger  than  itself’  and  ‘stronger’   than  its  pleasures  and  desires,   it   is  
this one (430e6-431d5). 
 
Socrates’   analysis   of   the   expressions   ‘stronger’   and   ‘weaker’   than   oneself 
emerges out of his effort to determine what it means for a city to possess the virtue of 
moderation. He assumes that moderation must involve control over pleasures and desires, 
a   point   at   which   he   takes   popular   expressions   such   as   ‘stronger   than   oneself’   to   hint.  
What is noteworthy, however, is that Socrates falls short of endorsing the popular use of 
those expressions. He does not, that is, endorse the sort of use that the many make of 
those expressions in the Protagoras.15 Rather, he claims that he “does not know what 
they mean” (οὐκ oi\δ j ὅντινα τρόπον, 430e6) when they say such things, but that he 
nonetheless thinks those expressions, if properly construed, have something to teach 
about moderation. His own construal understands being   ‘stronger’   or   ‘weaker’   than  
oneself in terms of psychic control or mastery: when what is better in an individual is in 
control  of  what  is  worse,  the  individual  is  ‘stronger  than  himself’;;  when  what  is  worse  is  
in  control,  the  individual  is  ‘weaker  than  himself’.16 He then applies this same analysis to 
the city: when what is better in the city rules over   the  worse,   the  city   is   ‘stronger   than  
itself’; when  the  opposite  is  the  case,  the  city  is  ‘weaker  than  itself’. In order to complete 
the aim of his discussion, Socrates goes on to identify moderation in the city as the 
condition in which, not only does the better part of the city rule, but everyone in the city 
also shares the opinion that it ought to rule.17 
                                                 
15 Dorter (2006: 109) also draws attention to the connection between Rep. 430e  ff.  and  the  many’s  
position in the Protagoras. 
16 Having not yet introduced the tripartite soul, Socrates does not speak explicitly of parts, but 
uses the substantivized τὸ βέλτιον and τὸ χεῖρον. 
17 Further discussion of 430d ff. can be found in Annas 1981: 115-8; Dorion 2012: 34-8; Dorter 
2006: 107-10; and Dyson 1976: 36. 
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 It is important to note a shift in language that occurs in the above passage. When 
Socrates speaks of the individual case of being   ‘stronger’   or   ‘weaker’   than  oneself, he 
speaks  of  one  element  in  the  soul  ‘controlling’ or ‘mastering’ (ἐγκρατές, κρατῃθῇ) the 
other. When he applies his analysis to the political case, however, he speaks of one 
element in the city ‘ruling’ (ἄρχει) the other. The two cases are clearly meant to be 
analogous: Socrates tells  Glaucon  that  he  will  find  “one  of  these  conditions” in their city. 
The use of ‘ruling’  in  parallel  to  ‘controlling’  and  ‘mastering’, therefore, shows that the 
kind of control or mastery involved in the individual case is to be understood on the 
model of rulership. Socrates does not yet make this point explicit, but it is clearly implied 
by the passage. It is, moreover, confirmed by Socrates’ treatment of virtuous and vicious 
souls in Books 4, 8, and 9, where the notion of psychic rule becomes absolutely central 
(and  where   such   rule   is   sometimes  characterized  as   ‘controlling’  or   ‘mastering’). After 
introducing the three parts of the soul, for example, Socrates says that the reasoning part 
of the soul is supposed to rule (441e4),  but   that   the  appetitive  part  “attempts to enslave 
[καταδουλώσασθαι] and rule over the classes   it   isn’t   fitted   to   rule” (442b1-2). 
Moderation in the soul, moreover, like moderation in the city, involves an agreement 
among   the   soul’s   parts   that the best part ought to rule (442c-d). Socrates concludes, 
“Then   isn’t   to   produce   justice   to   establish   the   parts   of   the   soul   in   a   natural   relation   of  
mastering, and being mastered by [κρατεῖν τε καὶ κρατεῖσθαι], one another, while to 
produce injustice is to establish a relation of ruling and being ruled [ἄρχειν τε καὶ 
ἄρχεσθαι] contrary to nature?” (444d8-11).18  Socrates goes on, in Books 8 and 9, to 
                                                 
18 Whiting (2012: 200-2) argues, on the basis of 444d8-11 and the medical analogy on which 
Socrates   draws   in   that   passage,   that   Plato   employs   the   terms   ‘master’   (κρατεῖν)   and   ‘rule’  
(ἄρχειν) differently in the Republic.   She   suggests   that   for   Plato,   ‘mastery’   consists   in   the  
‘healthy’   blending   of   the   soul’s   elements,   such   that   no   distinct   part   or   parts   are   required   to  
maintain   control   over   other   distinct   parts.   ‘Ruling’,   on   the   other   hand,   involves   an   ‘unhealthy’  
separation  of  the  soul’s  elements,  such  that  some  parts  do need  to  control  others.  Plato’s  ideal, she 
suggests, is modeled on the former, rather than the latter: in the ideal soul, there will not be 
distinct, competing elements, and hence no need for any of those elements to control the others. 
She  writes,  “The  true  ideal  is  ultimately  anarchic,  and  […]  the  need  for  ruling  and  being  ruled  is  
already  problematic.”  Whiting’s  distinction  between  κρατεῖν and ἄρχειν, however, simply does 
not  hold  up   to   an  examination  of  Plato’s  use  of   those   two   terms   throughout   the   text.  We  have  
already seen, how, at 430e6-431d5, Socrates assimilates the concept of mastery to the concept of 
rule. Moreover, in that same passage, he describes the unhealthy state  of  the  individual’s  soul  in  
terms of mastery and the healthy state of the city in terms of rule. Likewise, he uses the two terms 
(and a wide variety of others, for that matter) indiscriminately and interchangeably throughout the 
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discuss   the   various   kinds   of   psychic   ‘regimes’   that   can   arise,   and   the   language   of   rule  
continues to dominate that discussion: parts of the soul and their desires ‘rule’   one  
another (ἀρχήν, 550b6; cf. 571c4, 590c4);;   they   ‘enslave’   one   another  
(καταδουλωσάμενος, 553d2; cf. 577d4);;   they   ‘master’   (κρατούσας, 554e1; cf. 
574d9)   or   ‘control’   (ἐγκρατέστατος, 589b1) one another; and they act as kings 
(βασιλέα, 555c6), tyrants (τυραννευθείς, 574e2), and despots (δεσπόζειν, 577d5).  
 What all of this shows is that it is the notion of psychic rule, not akrasia, that is 
central   to   Plato’s   understanding   of   the   relationships   and   interactions   among   the   three  
parts of the soul.19 This is precisely why Socrates claims not to know what the many 
mean when they use  the  phrases  ‘stronger’  or  ‘weaker’  than  oneself.  On  the popular view, 
those expressions refer to cases of akratic and enkratic action. If Plato had intended to 
countenance akrasia in the Republic, we would expect him to make that clear in a 
discussion of the popular phrases used to refer to it. Instead, Plato has Socrates distance 
himself  from  the  many’s  understanding  of  being  ‘weaker’  and  ‘stronger’  than  oneself  in 
order to reinterpret those expressions in anticipation of the ethical and psychological 
account that follows. In this way Plato does what he often does: he appropriates a popular 
notion and reworks it for his own philosophical purposes. Significantly, the phrases 
‘stronger’  and  ‘weaker’ than  oneself  disappear  from  the  text  following  Socrates’  analysis  
of them at 430e-431d. Having recast the popular language of akrasia in terms of psychic 
rule, it is the latter that becomes the focus of the text. This revision of the popular notion 
is highlighted in Book 9: Socrates concludes that the best, most just, and happiest 
                                                                                                                                                 
text:   at   550b,   the   spirited   part   ‘rules’   the   soul;;   at   554e1,   the   oligarchic   man’s   better   desires  
‘master’  his  worse;;  at  571c4,  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  is  approvingly  referred  as  the  ‘ruling’  
part;;  at  574d9,  just  beliefs  are  ‘mastered’  by  unjust  ones;;  at  590c4,  the  reasoning  part  of  the  soul  
is  too  weak  to  ‘rule’  the  other  parts;;  and  at  606d5  poetry  establishes  our  non-rational impulses as 
‘rulers’   in   us   when   instead   “they   ought   to   be   ruled”.   Finally,   the   decisive   blow   to  Whiting’s  
proposal of an anarchic ideal comes at 580b8-c4,  where  Socrates  concludes,  “Shall  we,  then,  hire  
a herald, or shall I myself announce that the son of Ariston has given as his verdict that the best, 
the most just, and the most happy is the most kingly, who is king of himself [βασιλεύοντα 
αὑτοῦ].” 
19 Kahn (1996: 254-5) recognizes this point, stating that in the Republic,  “[Plato’s]  concern  is  not  
with moral weakness  but  with  alternative  principles  that  can  rule  in  the  psyche.”  Ferrari  (2007:  
169) concurs that akrasia is  not  Plato’s  focus:  “All  should  agree   that  it   is   the  wider  concept  of  
mental conflict rather than the narrower concept of weakness of will that Book 4 in fact 
discusses.”  Cf.  also  Shields  2007:  82. 
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individual   is   the   one  who   is   ‘king   of   himself’,  while   the  worst,  most   unjust,   and  most  
miserable  individual  is  the  one  who  is  ‘tyrant  of  himself’  (580b-c). The language of being 
‘king’   or   ‘tyrant’   of oneself is clearly intended to parallel the paradoxical language of 
being  ‘stronger’  and  ‘weaker’  than oneself. The notion of akrasia, however, has been left 
behind in favor of psychic rule.   
 
3. The Rule of Appetite 
 
Although Plato makes psychic rule the central notion in the Republic’s  treatment  
of the tripartite soul, that does not yet preclude the possibility that akrasia has an 
important role to play in the text as well.  In  particular,  if  it  turns  out  that  appetite’s  rule or 
control in the soul prominently involves, or is precipitated by, instances of akratic 
behavior, then akrasia would prove to be more important to Plato’s moral psychology 
than I have so far suggested.20  Given   that   appetite’s   control   of   the   soul   necessarily 
involves some sort of subversion or domination of the reasoning part, it is worth asking 
whether that subversion or domination amounts to, or involves, akrasia. In what follows I 
will examine the picture of appetitive psychic rule that emerges over the course of the 
Republic, and I will argue that akratic action does not play any significant role in that 
picture: the manner in which appetite comes to take control of the soul does not involve 
or amount to akrasia, nor does its rule consist in the akratic domination of reason.  
 There are two seemingly distinct—but ultimately reconcilable, I will show—
models of appetitive psychic rule that are suggested by the text. According to the first, 
which I will refer to as the Ignorance Model, appetite’s  subversion  of  reason  involves  the  
corruption of rational judgments. On this model, the individual who is ruled by her 
appetitive part is ignorant: she holds mistaken beliefs about what is valuable or good, and 
those mistaken beliefs are informed by the interests of the appetitive part of her soul. 
There are at least three important discussions in the Republic that support this model. The 
first  is  Socrates’  analysis  of  ‘vicious’  psychic  regimes  in  Books  8  and  9.  Throughout  that  
                                                 
20 Lesses  (1987:  148),  for  example,  understands  appetite’s  unjust  rule  of  reason  to  involve  akratic  
behavior. I focus on appetite in what follows because it is the part of the soul responsible for the 
kinds of desires most commonly associated with akratic behavior—namely, desires for pleasure. 
See §5 for further discussion. 
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discussion Socrates’  description  of  the  manner  in  which  a  new  psychic element comes to 
assume  control  of   a  person’s   soul  overwhelmingly   emphasizes   changes   in   the  person’s  
beliefs. Perhaps the clearest example, and certainly the one most relevant to the present 
discussion, is his  characterization  of  the  oligarchic  individual’s  origins: 
Don’t  you  think  that  this  person  would  establish  his  appetitive  and  money-making part on 
the throne, setting it up as the great king within himself [ἐγκαθίζειν καὶ μέγαν βασιλέα 
ποιεῖν ἐν ἑαυτῷ], adorning it with golden tiaras and collars and girding it with Persian 
swords?... He makes the reasoning and spirited parts sit on the ground beneath appetite, 
one on either side, reducing them to slaves [καταδουλωσάμενος].  He  won’t  allow  the  
first to reason about or investigate anything except how a little money can be made into 
great  wealth.  And  he  won’t  allow  the  second  to  value  or  admire  anything  but  wealth  and  
wealthy people or to have any ambition other than the acquisition of wealth or whatever 
might contribute to getting it (553c4-d7). 
 
In this dramatic depiction, appetite becomes the ruler of the oligarchic 
individual’s  soul,  while  reason  becomes  the  slave  of  appetite.  However,  it  is  clear  that  the  
appetitive   part’s   domination   of   reason   does   not   consist in forcing the individual to act 
contrary to his rational judgments. Rather, its domination of reason consists in changing 
what  reason’s  judgments  are.21 The oligarchic individual uses his reasoning for nothing 
other than figuring out how to maximize his wealth. Far from being opposed to his 
appetitive interests and desires, his reasoning actually supports those interests and assists 
him in promoting them. The oligarchic man, then, does not pursue money akratically; he 
pursues it having come to believe that wealth is the greatest good.  
 Similarly,   Socrates   says   that   an   individual   becomes   ‘democratic’   when   the  
‘unnecessary’   appetites in him perceive that he lacks learning (μαθημάτων) and true 
speeches (λόγων ἀληθῶν) in  the  ‘Acropolis’  of  his  soul.  “And in the absence of these 
guardians”,   Socrates   explains,   “false and pretentious speeches and beliefs [ψευδεῖς δὴ 
                                                 
21 Carone (2001:135) also draws on this passage to support the view that non-rational domination 
of reason in general involves influencing  rational  judgment:  “When  a  lower  part  predominates,  it  
does   so   by   making   the   whole   soul   subject   to   its   desires   and   beliefs.”   My   understanding   of  
appetite’s   ‘rule’   in   the   oligarchic   soul   is   consistent   with   the   accounts   of   Brown   2012:   68-9; 
Cooper 1999b: 127,   n.   13;;   Johnstone   2011;;   and  Lorenz   2006:   157.  Brown  understands  Plato’s  
conception   of   psychic   rule   to   be   informed   by   what   he   calls   the   ‘principle   of   psychological  
hegemony’,  according  to  which,  “To  be  ruled  by  a  soul-part is to take the ends of that soul-part to 
be  one’s  ends,  generally.”  Johnstone  provides  an  especially  in-depth and insightful analysis of the 
regime changes in Books 8 and 9.  
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.2. p. 57-91, 2014.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p57-91
68 
  
καὶ ἀλαζόνες λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι] rush up and occupy this part of him” (560b7-c3).22 
As in the case of the oligarchic individual, the regime change that takes place in the 
democratic  man’s  soul  is  characterized  in  part  by  a  change  in  his  beliefs.  The  words  that  
Plato uses to describe those beliefs and the speeches that accompany them are significant, 
moreover. First, they are false beliefs—that is, they amount to instances of ignorance. 
Second,  they  are  ‘pretentious’  or  ‘boastful’  speeches  and  beliefs:  although  they  are  false,  
they misleadingly present themselves as true. They are, in other words, persuasive. 
Significantly, Plato often associates  ‘pretentious’  speech  of  this  kind  with the appetitive 
part of the soul and with its characteristic object, pleasure. In the Philebus, for example, 
Socrates declares that pleasure   is   “the   greatest   pretender   of   all” (ἁπάντων 
ἀλαζονίστατον, 65c5), and in the Phaedrus,   he   characterizes   the   ‘bad’   horse,  which  
represents the appetitive part   of   the   tripartite   soul,   as   a   “companion of pretension” 
(ἀλαζονείας ἑταῖρος, 253e3). The plausible idea contained in these characterizations is 
that, when we are under the influence of our desires for pleasure, we often entertain, and 
sometimes ultimately accept, spurious chains of reasoning that support and justify the 
indulgence of those desires. In other words, we rationalize our appetites. This is, in fact, 
precisely the effect that the bad horse tries to bring about in the Phaedrus. When the 
individual resists his appetitive desire for sexual contact with a beautiful boy, the bad 
horse tries to convince the good horse and the charioteer (representing the spirited and 
reasoning parts of the soul, respectively) to follow its lead by tempting them with 
‘pretentious’  rhetoric.  What  all  of  this suggests is that when the appetitive part of the soul 
and its desires exert control over, or assume rule of, the soul, that control or rule 
                                                 
22 And  cf.  Socrates’  mention  of  beliefs  in  his  discussion  of  the  tyrannical  individual:  “And  in  all  
this, the old traditional opinions that he held from childhood about what is fine or shameful—
opinions that are accounted just—are mastered (κρατήσουσι) by the opinions, newly released 
from  slavery,  that  are  now  the  bodyguard  of  erotic  love”  (574d5-9). Socrates concludes that the 
soul   of   the   tyrant   “least   of   all   does   what   it   wants”   (ἥκιστα ποιεῖ ἅ βούλεται), and that, 
“forcibly  dragged  by  the  stings  of  a  dronish  gadfly,  it  will  be  full  of  disorder  and  regret”  (ὑπὸ δὲ 
οἴστρου ἀεὶ ἑλκομένη βίᾳ ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστὴ ἔσται, 577d10-e3). Notice that 
his  conclusions  distinctly  echo  the  ‘Socratic’  claims  of  two  earlier  dialogues.  First,  in  the  Gorgias 
Socrates   argues   that   although   tyrants  do  “whatever   they   think  best”   (αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον 
ei\ναι), they do not do what they really want (βούλονται) (466d9-e1 and ff.). Second, in the 
Protagoras Socrates  asserts  that  the  Power  of  Appearances  “makes  us  wander  all  over  the  place  
in confusion, often changing our minds about the same things and regretting [μεταμέλειν] our 
actions  and  choices”  (356d4-8). Cf. remarks in Price 1995: 103 and Parry 2007: 391-3. 
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characteristically   involves   a   change   in   the   individual’s   beliefs.   The   individual   accepts  
false,   ‘pretentious’ reasons for acting or living as his appetites incline him. For that 
reason, he is not akratic, but simply ignorant. 
 A second passage that supports the Ignorance Model can be found in Book 3. The 
young guardians, Socrates says, must be tested in pleasures, pains, and fears in order to 
make sure that they remain committed to the lawful beliefs that have been inculcated in 
them through early musical and gymnastic training. He then explains the various ways in 
which beliefs can be lost or abandoned. While everyone abandons false beliefs 
‘voluntarily’,  true  beliefs  are always abandoned involuntarily, on account of one of three 
causes: theft, compulsion, or magic (412e-412b). Socrates explains: 
By  ‘the  victims  of  theft’  I mean those who are persuaded to change their minds or those 
who forget, because time, in the latter case, and argument, in the former, takes away their 
beliefs without their realizing it […] By   ‘the   compelled’ I mean those whom pain or 
suffering causes to change their mind [μεταδοξάσαι] […] The   ‘victims   of   magic’, I 
think  you’d  agree,  are  those  who  change  their  mind  [μεταδοξάσωσιν] because they are 
under the spell of pleasure or fear (413b4-c3). 
 
Once again, the picture of appetitive control of the soul that emerges from this 
passage is one in which appetite assumes psychic power or   influences   the   individual’s  
behavior  by  bringing  about  a  change  in  the  individual’s  beliefs. Nothing in this passage 
suggests   that   appetites  assume  control   in   the  soul  or   influence  an   individual’s  behavior  
simply by forcing the individual to act against his better judgment. Rather, his non-
rational affections and desires, including those related to pleasure, bring about his action 
(if they do at all) by making him (at least temporarily) ignorant: they cause him to 
abandon a true belief. 23  A further point suggests that non-rational impulses affect 
behavior exclusively by causing the individual to change his mind. In his immediately 
subsequent remarks, Socrates outlines the tests and trials to which the young must submit 
in order to determine which of them are more fit to become rulers. Crucially, the only 
trials he requires of them are those that test their retention of lawful beliefs in the face of 
pleasures and pains. If akrasia were possible, or at least, if it were a phenomenon that 
                                                 
23 O’Brien  (1967:  138,  n.  21;;  cf.  155)  observes,  “At  Rep. 412e the danger to the young Guardians-
in-training is not that they will act against their right opinion but that they will lose it through 
persuasion,  pain,  pleasure,  or  fear.” 
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Plato considered ubiquitous or significant, then we would not expect such tests to 
represent a complete, effective examination   of   the   guardians’   moral   fortitude.   For if 
akrasia were  a   threat,   then  maintaining  one’s lawful belief about how one ought to act 
would not be sufficient for actually behaving that way.  The  fact   that  Socrates’  presents  
the retention of correct beliefs as the sole criterion of success in these tests, then, suggests 
that whenever people act viciously on account of their non-rational impulses, they do so 
because they have changed their minds.24 
 Finally,   in  Book  7,  Socrates   likens   appetitive  pleasures   to   ‘leaden  weights’   that  
‘bind’  the  soul  to  the  realm  of  becoming.  They  drag  reason’s  vision  downward,  he  says, 
thereby preventing it   from   turning   ‘upward’   toward   the   realm   of   true   reality   (519a-b). 
This  image  echoes  Socrates’  claim in the Phaedo that pleasures and pains are nails that 
‘rivet’  the  soul  to  the  body  and  make  it  share  the  body’s  beliefs  and  desires  (83c-d). What 
these images suggest is that appetites and their associated pleasures subvert the authority 
of reason by misdirecting its focus. Under the influence of pleasure, the rational part of 
the soul pays attention to, reasons about, and comes to desire the ends of appetite. 
Socrates confirms this interpretation in his introduction to the ‘leaden  weights’  image:  he  
says that the reasoning  of  those  who  are  reputedly  “vicious  but  clever”  is  “forced to serve 
evil ends, so that the sharper it sees, the more evil   it   accomplishes” (519a1-6). The 
picture of appetitive domination of reason that we find here, then, is precisely that which 
we find in the case of the oligarchic individual: appetite does not force the individual to 
act against the resistance of his better judgment, but rather changes  what  the  individual’s  
judgments and values are to begin with.  
 The Ignorance Model of appetitive psychic rule indicates that appetite subverts 
reason’s  authority  in  the  soul  by  influencing  the  latter’s  judgments:  appetite rules reason 
by corrupting it and making it ignorant. But the text also supports another, seemingly 
distinct, model of appetitive psychic rule: the Hydraulic Model. The crucial support for 
this model is found in a passage from Book 6: 
We surely know that,  when   someone’s   desires   incline   strongly   for   one   thing,   they   are  
thereby weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another 
                                                 
24 I explore this passage and its implications in much more detail in Wilburn (forthcoming). Cf. 
also discussion in Carone 2001: 131-2.  
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channel […] So,  when   someone’s   desires   flow   toward   learning   and   everything   of   that  
sort,  he’d  be  concerned,  I  suppose,  with  the  pleasures  of  the  soul  itself  by  itself,  and  he’d  
abandon those pleasures that come through the body – if indeed he is a true philosopher 
and not merely a counterfeit one […] Then surely such a person is moderate and not at all 
a money-lover (485d6-e3). 
 
The passage indicates that our desires (particularly our appetitive and rational 
ones) bear something like a zero-sum relation to one another: as one set of desires gets 
stronger, our other desires become correspondingly weaker.25 Socrates’  focus  here is on 
the relationship between reason and appetite. When our rational desires become strong, 
he says, our appetites for bodily pleasure and money are thereby weakened. The clear 
implication is that the converse is also true: when our appetitive desires are strong, our 
rational ones will thereby be weakened as well. This picture is confirmed throughout the 
text by comments that point to a competitive tension between rational and appetitive 
interests. While describing the   city’s   shift   toward   an oligarchic regime in Book 8, for 
example,   Socrates   says,   “From there they proceed further into money-making, and the 
more honorable they consider it, the less honorable they consider virtue. Or  aren’t  virtue  
and wealth opposed, as if they were set on the scales of a balance, always inclining in 
opposite   directions?” (550e4-8).26 What these passages indicate is that our appetitive 
desires do not motivate us completely ‘independently’  of  our  rational ones. That is, it is 
not the case that our appetites can become strong enough to overcome our rational desires 
without   thereby   affecting   the   strength   of   those   rational   desires.   Rather,   appetite’s  
becoming strong enough to determine our behavior necessarily involves a corresponding 
decrease in the strength of our rational motivations.27 According to this Hydraulic Model, 
appetite’s  domination  of reason involves a weakening of reason and its desires.  
 On the surface, at least, the Hydraulic Model seems distinct from the Ignorance 
Model. The latter takes appetitive rule to involve the corruption of the reasoning part, 
                                                 
25 Brown (2012: 68) also draws attention to this passage and its endorsement of what he calls the 
‘hydraulic  principle  of  psychology’.  The  channeling  passage  is  also  discussed  in  Gill  1985:  19-
21; Grube 1980: 135; and Kahn 1987: 95-101. 
26 Cf. 328d and 605b3-5. 
27 Carone (2004: 71; cf. 2001: 128-29) notes the trouble 485d poses for advocates of the view that 
“desire  can  have  a   strength   independent  of   the  strength  of   reason,   if   that   is   taken   to   imply   that  
desire  can  get  stronger  without  reason  getting  weaker,  and  vice  versa.”   
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while the former takes it to involve the weakening of it. As a matter of fact, however, 
there is no reason why we should not understand these to amount to the same thing. The 
two models can be reconciled as  long  as  we  understand  reason’s  ‘weakness’ to consist in 
its susceptibility to make false judgments and desire the wrong things under the influence 
of non-rational appetite and emotion. In other words, the stronger appetite and its desires 
become, the weaker reason becomes; and the weaker reason becomes, the weaker and 
more unstable its practical judgments become, leaving them vulnerable to the deceptive 
influence of appetite.28 There is, in fact, textual support for this reconciliation of the two 
models. In Book 9 Socrates asks, “Why do you think that the condition of a manual 
worker is despised? Or is it for any other reason than that, when the best part is naturally 
weak [ἀσθενές] in  someone,  it  can’t  rule  [μὴ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν] the beasts within him 
but can only serve them and learn the things that flatter them [ἀλλὰ θεραπεύειν ἐκεῖνα, 
καὶ τὰ θωπεύματα αὐτῶν μόνον δύνηται μανθάνειν]?” (590c2-6). Here Socrates 
makes it clear that what it means for reason to be weak is  for  it  to  become  a  ‘servant’  of  
the lower parts of the soul. Just as the reasoning part of the oligarchic individual does 
nothing but calculate how to maximize profit, so the reasoning part in this passage 
‘learns’  only   the things that give pleasure to the non-rational soul-parts. Because of its 
weakness, what reason studies, calculates, and learns are determined by the interests of 
appetite  and  spirit,  and  as  a  result  reason’s judgments—and, ultimately, its desires—are 
corrupted.  Thus  ‘weakness’  in  this  passage is clearly to be understood in accordance with 
the Ignorance Model of psychic control. Reason’s  being weak does not mean that, despite 
maintaining the correct judgments about what the individual ought to do, it is brutely 
‘forced’  to  go  along  with  appetite  anyway;;  rather,  it  means  that,  under  the  influence  of  a  
strong appetite, it is unable to reach or maintain the correct judgments to begin with.29 
                                                 
28 Cf.  Brown’s  discussion  of   the  connection  between  his   ‘principle  of  psychological  hegemony’  
and  ‘hydraulic  principle  of  psychology’:  “The   two  casual  principles  are  related.  For   instance,  a  
rational part can come to accept that honor or victory is what is good only if it is too weak to 
grasp   what   is   really   good,   but   it   will   be   too   weak   if   the   spirit   has   taken   much   of   the   soul’s  
‘hydraulic  power’  away  from  reason”  (2012:  69). 
29 The  account  I  have  offered  of  appetite’s  rule  or  domination  of  reason  is  not  unlike  the  account  
that Brickhouse and Smith offer of the ways in which non-rational impulses influence reasoning 
in   earlier,   ‘Socratic’   dialogues   like   the  Protagoras.  They  write   (2010:   71;;   cf.   2007):   “Socrates  
believes that appetites and passions can be either strong or weak and that a strong appetite or 
passion is more likely to cause an unknowing agent to believe that the pleasure at which it aims is 
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4. Why Not Akrasia? 
 
If the picture I have outlined is correct, then acknowledging and explaining 
akrasia was never a significant concern for Plato and hence was not the motivation for 
tripartite theory. Instead, Plato’s  concern  in the Republic was with the broader notion of 
psychic control or rule, which he understood on the model of ignorance and weak or 
corrupt judgment. The question at this point is the following: why was accounting for 
akrasia never a primary concern for Plato?  
In order to answer that question, we should begin by distinguishing two ways in 
which the reasoning part of the soul might fail to maintain proper control or rule in the 
soul. The first type of failure is (1) local failure. Local failures are temporary failures of 
reason: an individual fails to carry out her rational judgment in a specific instance under 
the influence of non-rational appetite or emotion. Local failures can in turn be divided 
into two kinds. First, (1a) temporary changes of judgment: an individual initially judges 
that a given action is wrong, but she temporarily changes her mind under the influence of 
appetite and ends up performing the action anyway. Afterward, her initial judgment of 
the   action’s   value   returns,   and   the   agent   regrets, or may regret, having performed it. 
Second, (1b) instances of akrasia: the individual judges that a given action is wrong, but 
her appetite is more psychologically forceful than her judgment, and she performs the 
action while continuing to believe that she should not.30  The second main type of failure 
is (2) global failure. Global failures represent long-term, systematic corruptions of an 
individual’s  reasoning  about  what  is  valuable.  Under  the  influence  of  non-rational desire 
                                                                                                                                                 
in   fact   a   good   […]   The   stronger   the   appetite,   the   more   ‘convincing’   this   power   will   be.”  
However,  they  take  this  picture  to  be  “entirely  distinct from what we find in the later books of the 
Republic”  (2010:  107).  Ferrari  (2007:  199)  evidently  shares  my  interpretation  of  psychic  rule  in  
the Republic: he claims that any soul that falls short of the ideal rule of reason falls short not only 
because the other parts are strong, but also because reason is correspondingly weak. He then adds 
(n.   27):   “This   schema   leaves   room   for   the   possibility   that   the  weakness   of  will   to  which   such  
imperfect characters might be subject could continue to be traced to an intellectual mistake, to 
wrong thinking, as we found Socrates claiming in dialogues other than the Republic.” 
30 Failures  of  type  (1a)  and  (1b)  correspond  to  instances  of  what  Penner  calls  ‘diachronic  belief  
akrasia’  and  ‘synchronic  belief  akrasia’,   respectively.  See  discussion  in  Penner  1990:  45-6 and 
1997: 124. 
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and   emotion,   the   individual’s   judgments   about   what is good, and hence about which 
practical goals are worth pursuing and how it is best to structure her life, are mistaken. 
This is the type of failure that, according to my interpretation, primarily concerns Plato in 
the Republic.  Those  who  are  ‘weaker  than  pleasure’  in  the  Republic’s  sense,  such  as  the  
oligarchic individual, exhibit global failures of this kind: appetite, rather than reason, 
rules their souls. 
 With these distinctions in place, we can identify at least two reasons why Plato 
was concerned with psychic control or rule rather than akrasia. The first has to do with 
the ethical priority of global failures. Simply put, for the purposes of promoting virtue 
and minimizing vice, the prevention and correction of global failures is much more 
important than the prevention of local ones. We can see adumbrations of this point by 
examining  Plato’s  treatment  of  the  many’s  position in the Protagoras. According to the 
many, people frequently fail to do something they know is good and willingly do 
something they know is worse instead because they  are  ‘overcome  by  pleasure’. In other 
words, the many claim that people can and often do act akratically. Significantly, in 
Socrates’  reply  to  their  account,  he  places  repeated stress on  the  many’s  commitment  to 
hedonism. In the exchange leading up to his refutation of their position, Socrates provides 
at least three explicit opportunities for the many to acknowledge some other criterion of 
goodness aside from pleasure, and all three times he and Protagoras attest to their failure 
to do so.31 Finally, in the passage that immediately precedes  Socrates’  argument against 
their view, he says:  
                                                 
31 See 354b7-c3, 354d1-4, and 354d7-e2. Cf. discussion in Vlastos 1969: 77, n. 24. Against this 
view, however, Ferrari 1990: 132-4 and n. 29; Hackforth 1928: 41; Irwin 1977: 309, n. 13; and 
Nussbaum  1986:  111,  argue  that  hedonism  is  not  really  the  many’s  position.  Rather,  they  claim,  
Socrates has to argue them  into  it.  As  evidence,  they  cite  the  fact  that  in  response  to  Protagoras’  
initial   resistance   to  Socrates’  suggestion   that  all  pleasures  are  good,  Socrates  asks,  “Surely  you  
don’t,   like   the  many,  call  some  pleasant   things  bad  and  some  painful   things  good?”   (351c2-3). 
However, if we turn to the Republic, we can see that this passage does not necessarily tell against 
the  many’s  hedonism.  In his discussion with Adeimantus about the nature of the Good in Book 6, 
Socrates   remarks,   “You   certainly   know   that   the  many   believe   the   good   is   pleasure,   while   the  
more  sophisticated  believe  that  it  is  knowledge.”  Then,  after  explaining  how  those  who  define the 
good   as   knowledge   run   into   difficulties,   he   asks,   “What   about   those   who   define   the   good   as  
pleasure?  Are  they  any  less   full  of  confusion   than  the  others?  Aren’t  even  they  forced   to  admit  
that there are bad pleasures? [...] So, I think, they have to agree that the same things are both good 
and  bad.  Isn’t  that  true?”  (505b5-c11). What these comments suggest is that Plato took the many 
to be committed both to hedonism and (despite its being in tension with hedonism) to the view 
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Even now it is still possible to withdraw, if you are able to say that the good is anything 
other than pleasure or that the bad is anything other than pain. Or is it enough for you to 
live pleasantly without pain? If it is enough, and you are not able to say anything else 
than that the good and the bad are that which result in pleasure and pain, listen to this. For 
I say to you that if this is so, your position will become ridiculous [γελοῖον] (354e8-
355a6). 
 
These remarks are noteworthy for two reasons. First, because the many wrongly 
identify pleasure with the  good,  they  count  as  individuals  who  are  ‘ruled  by  pleasure’  or  
‘weaker   than   pleasure’   in   the   sense   carved   out   by   the   Republic. Second, Socrates 
expressly   identifies   the  many’s   hedonism   as   the   source   of   the   ‘ridiculousness’   of   their  
position: if the many cannot identify anything good other than pleasure, he says, then 
their position will turn out to be ridiculous. Socrates elucidates this alleged ridiculousness 
by substituting the  word  ‘pleasure’  in  the  many’s  explanation  with  the  word  ‘good’.  He  
points out that, given the  many’s  hedonism, their position amounts to the following: that 
people pursue what is worse,  knowing  it  to  be  worse,  because  they  are  ‘weaker’ than the 
good. Now, there is some controversy  over  what  precisely  is  ‘ridiculous’  about  this  view, 
but I take at least part of what the many would find ridiculous about it is simply the idea 
that being weaker than what is good could be the correct explanation  of  an  individual’s  
pursuit of what is worse. Those who are ‘weaker than the good’ should be those who are 
pursuing what is better.32  
                                                                                                                                                 
that some pleasures are good and others bad. At any rate, it is clear that he did not find it 
implausible   for   these   two   commitments   to   sit   (uncomfortably,   in   Plato’s  mind)   alongside   one  
another,   particularly   in   those  who   are   ‘full   of   confusion’   like   the  many.   If   this   is   correct,   then 
Socrates’  comment  at  351c  does  nothing  to  undermine  the  hedonism  of  the  many. 
32  My   understanding   of   the   ‘ridiculous’   of   the   many’s position   is   in   line   with   Dyson’s  
interpretation  (1976:  36).  He  comments:  “What  is  absurd?  Merely  that,  on  a  very  simple  level,  the  
popular thesis is silly. One cannot explain why a man who can do something good does 
something which he knows is bad, by saying  that  he  is  overcome  by  good  […]  There  is  another  
linguistic  aspect  too:  the  verb  ‘overcome’,  ἡττώμενος, appropriate to reprehensible conditions 
in   moral   contexts,   is   ludicrous   when   combined   with   ‘by   good’,   ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.”   Vlastos  
(1956: xxxix) adopts a similar view, while Gallop (1964: 118-9)   responds   to  Vlastos’s  account  
and  proposes  a  much  more  complicated  understanding  of  the  ‘absurdity’  of  the  many’s  position.  
Gallop’s  interpretation  is  largely  motivated  by  the  assumption  that  when  Socrates  draws  attention 
to   the   ‘absurdity’  of   their  position,  he   is  drawing  attention   to  a   self-contradiction. Similarly, in 
response  to  Gallop’s  criticism,  Vlastos  (1969:  78-83) later repudiates his earlier view because he 
finds that it cannot account for the sense in which   the  many’s   position   contradicts   itself.   Like  
Dyson, however, I do not take Socrates to be pointing out a self-contradiction. (Or at least, I do 
not   take   the   ‘ridiculousness’   that   would   be   immediately   clear   and   compelling   to   the   many   to  
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There is, however, a further, related ridiculousness, which Socrates’  interlocutors  
no doubt fail to notice, but which comes to the surface when we substitute the word 
‘worse’   in   the   many’s   original   formulation   with   ‘less   pleasurable’ (again, a move 
justified by the hedonistic premise). The  many’s  position then becomes: people pursue 
what is less pleasurable, knowing it to be less pleasurable, because they are ‘weaker than 
pleasure’. The ridiculousness of this formulation parallels that of the previous one: being 
weaker than pleasure should mean that one is pursuing what is more pleasurable, not 
what is less pleasurable. The effect of this reformulation is that it   turns   the   many’s  
account on its head and exposes them for what they are—namely, individuals ruled by 
pleasure. The many believe that their being weaker than pleasure is limited to instances 
of momentary weakness in the face of temptation, and that such instances constitute the 
main obstacle to their happiness. That is why, when   Socrates   suggests   that   an   ‘art   of  
measurement’   would   provide   them  with   the   ability   to   unfailingly   select   the  maximum  
amount  of  pleasure,  they  greedily  embrace  it  as  their  ‘salvation’  in  life.  In  fact,  however,  
such an art of measurement would not provide the happiness the many desire. Because of 
their hedonism, the many turn out to be weaker than pleasure whether they resist 
immediate pleasure or not.33 Indeed, the preceding suggests that their being weaker than 
pleasure is demonstrated even more distinctly by those instances in which they 
successfully resist temptations for the sake of greater long-term pleasure—in other 
words, by precisely those instances in which they take themselves to have advanced their 
happiness  by  being  ‘stronger’ than pleasure. Because they wrongly identify pleasure and 
                                                                                                                                                 
consist in that kind of logical inconsistency.) This is not, in other words, a formal reductio. Nor 
should we suspect that it is supposed to be: γελοῖον does   not   mean   ‘self-contradictory’,   but  
rather  ‘ridiculous’  or  ‘deserving  of  laughter’.  What  Socrates  has  shown,  then, is simply that there 
is   something   ‘funny’   about   the   many’s   position—and that is why his imagined interlocutor 
immediately responds by laughing (γελάσεται, 355c8). Ferrari (1990: 119, n. 6) also endorses 
Dyson’s  interpretation. 
33 Ferrari’s  (1990)  admirable treatment of the Protagoras presses a similar line of interpretation. 
He argues that the many of the Protagoras are   ‘ignorant   of   their   ignorance’,   because   they  
wrongly   take   themselves   to   ‘know’   what   it   is   that   they need to live a good life—namely, a 
measuring   art   of   the   kind   outlined   by   Socrates.   However,   Ferrari   notes   (124),   “Even   if   those  
people  were  fully  adept  at  the  art  of  measurement  he  describes,  and  so  could  ‘find  security  in  life’  
(356e2,  e6),  they  would  not,  after  all,  truly  be  able  to  ‘save  their  lives’  […]  For  the  life  guided  by  
such  measurement   is   enslaved   to   the   body.”  Cf.   Segvic   2000:   31:   “The   akratic   agent   not   only  
lacks knowledge of what is better or best; he also wrongly believes that he possesses this 
knowledge.” 
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the good, their being weaker than pleasure is a permanent state, and that,   from  Plato’s  
point of view, is the real obstacle to their happiness. In other words, where the many 
perceive a merely local failure of reason, Plato identifies a much more serious, global 
failure.  
 An important passage from the Phaedo confirms this interpretation. Socrates 
claims that the so-called   ‘moderation’   of   ordinary   people   is   something   ‘strange’  
(ἄτοπος, 68d3), and he explains: 
Is it licentiousness of some sort that makes them moderate? We say this is impossible, yet 
their experience of this simple-minded moderation turns out to be similar: they fear to be 
deprived of other pleasures which they desire, so they keep away from some pleasures 
because they are mastered by others [ἄλλων ἀπέχονται ὑπ’ ἄλλων κρατούμενοι]. 
Now to be ruled by pleasure [τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἄρχεσθαι] is what they call 
licentiousness, but what happens to them is that they master certain pleasures because 
they are mastered by others. This is like what we mentioned just now, that in some way it 
is a kind of licentiousness that has made them moderate (68e3-69a4). 
 
Unlike the many of the Protagoras, the many in this passage successfully resist 
temptation. That is to say, where the many of the Protagoras manifest local failures of 
reason, the many of the Phaedo manifest  local  ‘successes’  of  reason.34 However, like the 
many of the Protagoras, the many of the Phaedo are hedonists. The reason they resist 
immediate temptation is for the sake of getting more pleasure in the long-term, and they 
therefore suffer the same global failure of reason as the many of the Protagoras. That is 
why   their   ‘moderation’ is   no   real   moderation   at   all:   “Such virtue is only an illusory 
appearance of virtue; it is in fact fit for slaves,   without   soundness   or   truth” (69b7-8). 
With respect to their judgments about value and their ultimate goals in life—the most 
important determinants of living well, for Plato—they are no better off than the 
‘licentious’  many  of  the  Protagoras.35 
                                                 
34 Ferrari (1990: 121-5, 134-6) also discusses this passage from the Phaedo as it relates to the 
discussion in the Protagoras. 
35 Indeed, some passages suggest that they might be worse off—e.g. Euth. 281c-e, which argues 
that  ‘courage’  and  ‘moderation’,  along  with  other  putative  goods  like  wealth,  honor,  and  power,  
are actually evils when they are controlled by ignorance. (Cf. Rep. 491b-c and Laws 696d-e.) 
Ferrari (1990: 136, n. 32) suggests that akratics are in at least one sense closer to philosophical 
awakening  than  those  who  exhibit  ‘popular’  moderation:  at  least  akratics  are  aware  that  there  is  
something wrong with them (even if they are mistaken about what that something is). 
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 What this shows is that preventing and correcting global failures is an ethical 
priority over correcting local ones. This is true both because of the depth, duration, and 
severity of the psychic impact associated with global failures, but also because, as the 
Phaedo makes  clear,  local  ‘successes’  of  reason  are  not  sufficient  for  possessing  virtue.  
The ability to maintain   and   carry   out   one’s   judgments   about  what   is   valuable   is   of   no  
benefit if one has mistaken values.36 Whether akrasia is possible or not in the Republic, 
then, it is simply not the primary concern of an ethical reformer.   
Further considerations suggest that the ethical priority of global failures is also 
connected to a psychological priority. In particular, I submit, global successes of reason 
psychologically entail and guarantee local ones: souls that are properly ruled by reason 
will not be subject to instances of local failure. Conversely, the only agents who locally 
fail to carry out their rational judgments under the influence of non-rational motivation 
are those whose souls are not properly ruled to begin with. Those who are in some way or 
other ruled by appetite, I would like to suggest, are especially prone to local failures of 
reason,   on  Plato’s  view. This, then, is the second reason why Plato was not concerned 
with acknowledging and explaining akrasia: if it occurs at all, it is a mere side effect of 
improper psychic rule. 
The Ignorance/Hydraulic Model of desire provides support for this interpretation. 
According to that model, a large part of what it means for reason to rule in the soul is for 
reason to be appropriately strong in relation to the other soul-parts. In those ruled by 
reason, therefore, appetite and its desires will be correspondingly weak. We have also 
seen  that,  when  appetite  is  strong  and  reason  weak,  appetite’s  relative  strength  consists  in  
its ability to corrupt reason’s   judgments,   and   reason’s   relative  weakness   consists   in   its  
susceptibility to that corruption. What this strongly suggests is that, in an individual 
whose  soul   is  properly  ruled,  precisely  the  converse  will  be  the  case:  appetite’s  relative  
weakness will consist in its inability to   influence   reason’s   judgments,   and   reason’s  
relative strength will consist in its invulnerability  to  appetite’s  influence.  In  other  words,  
in those ruled by reason, appetite will not be sufficiently strong, nor its desires 
                                                 
36 Cf. Ferrari 1990: 134:  “[The  many]  are  indeed  right  to  think  that  we  are  divided  between  our  
understanding of what is best, on the one side, and impulses which can conflict with it, on the 
other. The problem is that, on their conception of what this understanding would be, it (so to 
speak)  just  isn’t  worth  being  distinguished,  ultimately,  from  the  impulses  with  which  it  conflicts.” 
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP 
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.8, n.2. p. 57-91, 2014.
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v8i2p57-91
79 
  
psychologically salient enough, to make reason ‘change its mind’  (so to speak), even in 
local instances.  Appetite’s   psychic   influence  will   simply   be   too  weak   to   undermine   or  
corrupt  the  individual’s  rational judgment. Those ruled by reason, therefore, will not be 
subject to local failures of reason. 
 Conversely, those who are subject to local failures of reason will be those whose 
souls are not properly ruled to begin with. In particular, those whose souls are ruled by 
appetite and its associated desires seem,  on  Plato’s  view,  to be especially susceptible to, 
or at least candidates for, local failures. The reason is this: as we have seen, in those ruled 
by appetite—such as the oligarchic individual—appetite’s psychic influence has the 
effect that the individual rationally judges appetitive objects of desire to be valuable and 
worthy   of   pursuit.   As   a   result,   the   individual’s   reasoning   part   is   concerned   with  
calculating how to maximize pleasure or wealth in the long term. There will inevitably be 
instances, however, in which indulgence in immediate pleasures conflict with those 
rational goals. In those ruled by reason, conflicts  between  the  individual’s  rational  goals  
and immediate appetitive interests will perhaps arise as well. However, because the 
appetitive part of the soul is weak in those ruled by reason, it will not have the psychic 
prominence necessary either to generate substantial psychic conflict or, a fortiori, to 
actually determine the individual’s   behavior. Those ruled by appetite, however, ex 
hypothesi have an appetitive part that exerts a powerful psychic influence. As a result, it 
is strong enough not only to bring about a global failure of reason, but also to bring about 
the kind of salient psychic conflict that can lead to local failures when immediate 
temptations present themselves. Therefore, those ruled by appetite—like the Many of the 
Protagoras—will be those who have a special susceptibility to psychic conflict between 
appetite and reason and, ultimately, to local failures. 
 There is some direct support for this reading, moreover. In Book 8, Socrates 
explains  that,  because  of  the  oligarchic  man’s  lack  of  education,  he  will  possess  ‘dronish’  
and evil appetites that he will have to forcibly hold in  check  “by means of some decent 
part  of  himself” (554b-d).  Socrates   then  comments,   “So someone   like   that  wouldn’t  be  
entirely free from civil war within himself, and he wouldn’t  be  one,  but rather in some 
sense two, though generally his better desires are   in   control   of   his  worse” (554d9-e1). 
Significantly, Socrates does not call either the aristocratic  or  the  timocratic  individual  “in  
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some   sense   two”,   despite   the   fact   that   the   latter’s   soul   is   one   of   the   ‘vicious’   psychic  
regimes. It is not until the oligarchic individual—the one ruled by appetite—that we get 
this characterization. I take the explanation of this fact to lie precisely in the above 
analysis. In the aristocratic individual, and even in the timocratic one, the appetitive part 
of the soul is not strong enough to constitute a significant and sustained psychic obstacle 
to  the  individual’s  rational  desires  and  goals.  That  is  not  to  rule  out  the  possibility  that  the  
timocratic individual might be subject to local failures of reason. Certainly he might be 
subject to such failures as are associated with spirited anger, and perhaps he might even 
be subject to occasional failures due to the influence of appetite. The point, however, is 
that whatever recalcitrant impulses might arise in the aristocratic and timocratic 
individuals, it is not until the oligarchic individual that those impulses are prominent, 
powerful, and persistent enough to require constant, forcible repression. It is only those 
ruled by appetite  who  become  “in  some  sense  two”.37 
 If this is right, then the ethical priority of global failures is partly grounded in their 
psychological priority. Those susceptible to local failures will be those who have already 
failed   ‘globally’, and they will be susceptible to the former because of that global 
failure—because, that is, their souls are not properly ruled in the first place. Instilling 
proper rule in the soul is thus not only ethically more important than preventing instances 
of akrasia or wavering judgment; it is also psychologically sufficient for preventing such 
local failures. For  those  reasons,  establishing  correct  patterns  of  rule  in  the  soul  is  Plato’s  
primary objective in the Republic. 
                                                 
37 Whiting  (2012)  also  discusses  the  significance  of  the  oligarchic  individual’s  ‘doubleness’,  but  
she interprets it in light of her argument that the Republic   allows   for   what   she   calls   ‘radical  
psychic  contingency’.  According  to  her  interpretation,  it  is  contingent  both  what  sort  of  internal  
structure each of the soul-parts has in any given individual, as well as how many genuine parts 
actually belong to any given soul (175-6). About the appetitive part of the soul, she suggests that 
in well-ordered  individuals,  it  is  not  a  unified,  ‘agent-like’  part  of  the  soul  at  all,  but  more  like  a  
collection of disjointed desires. In increasingly vicious souls, however, it becomes increasingly 
unified and agent-like, and by the time we get to the oligarchic character, it has become a genuine 
part,   or   “something   like   an   organized   political   faction”   (198).   While   our   accounts   have   in  
common the view that in the oligarchic individual the appetitive part of the soul has become 
psychologically prominent in a way that it is not in more well-ordered souls, I do not share her 
temptation   to   think   that   it   is   any   less   a   ‘part’   (however   that   term   is   to   be   understood   in   the  
Republic) in those more well-ordered souls.  
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 We should not conclude, however, that local failures of reason are of no ethical 
concern at all to Plato. Given that indulgence in appetitive pleasure strengthens the 
appetitive part of the soul, on  Plato’s  view,38 instances of local failure will exacerbate a 
vicious psychic condition and make it more difficult to establish a virtuous one. 
Presumably, preventing local failures will be of concern especially with respect to the 
city’s   youths, whose souls are not yet mature enough to have acquired a stable and 
virtuous psychic ‘regime’, but who are ideally making progress toward such a condition 
by practicing good and decent behavior. By stimulating the appetitive part of their souls, 
local failures of reason would represent an obstacle to their moral development. And 
indeed, the discussion at 413 ff. makes it clear that some attention is paid to whether the 
young are successful in mastering problematic non-rational impulses. The important 
point, however, is that (as noted in §3) the kind of local failure with which Plato proves 
to be concerned in his discussion of early education is explicitly of type (1a), not (1b). He 
is concerned with monitoring and preventing cases of shifting and abandoned judgment 
in the young guardians, not cases of akratic action.  
This latter point, along with  Plato’s   focus  on   the  notion  of  psychic   rule  and the 
absence of any straightforward acknowledgment of a case of akrasia in the Republic, 
suggests two important conclusions. The first is that Plato may not have come to accept 
the possibility of akrasia after all, despite what commentators have widely accepted. The 
main case for thinking that he does accept its possibility, as noted earlier, lies in the case 
of  Leontius,  and  in  Socrates’  subsequent  remark  that  ‘in  other  cases’ we observe appetite 
‘forcing’  someone  contrary  to  his  reasoning.  What  our  examination  has shown, however, 
is that although Plato comfortably uses much of the language of akrasia throughout the 
Republic, he recasts that language for his own purposes. Non-rational soul-parts and 
impulses—particularly appetitive ones—‘force’   us   to   change   our   minds   (βιασθέντας, 
413b9); they ‘rule’  and  ‘master’  reason;;  they  ‘enslave’  it (καταδουλωσάμενος, 553d2); 
they   ‘forcefully   drag   it’ (ἑλκομένη βίᾳ, 577e3);;   and   they   ‘compel’   it (ἀναγκάζειν, 
587a4). 39  Yet   Socrates’   glosses   on   these   expressions consistently reveal that he 
                                                 
38 See, for example, Rep. 442a-b and 588e-589a. 
39 And  compare  the  Athenian  Visitor’s  reference  to  the  ‘forceful’  (βιαίου) persuasion by which 
pleasure gets its way at Laws 863b8. 
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understands  appetite’s  domination  of   reason   to  occur   through   the  corruption  of   rational  
judgment.   Surely   this   at   least   leaves   open   the   possibility   that   when   appetites   ‘force’  
people contrary to their reasoning at 440b1, that force does not have to be interpreted on 
the akratic model.40 And if appetites do not cause akratic behavior in that crucial passage, 
then they do not evidently cause it anywhere in the Republic. 
                                                 
40 Carone (2001: 136-9) advocates (more strongly than I do) a similar reading of the Leontius 
case  and  of  Socrates’  subsequent  remarks.  She  writes  (138),  “Reason  is  ‘overpowered’  not  in  the  
sense that the agent performs the action while at the same time strongly believing that he should 
not, but in the sense that, at that moment, his reason has been weakened and come to adopt the 
beliefs   of   the   prevailing   part.”   Brickhouse   and   Smith   (2010:   206-10) offer a reply to Carone. 
They  object   that  her   interpretation  cannot  account   for  Socrates’  characterization of the cases in 
question  as  ones  in  which  reason  and  spirit  are  ‘allied’  in  their  opposition  to  the  appetites.  (Spirit  
‘allies   itself   with’   or   ‘fights   alongside’   [σύμμαχον]   reason,   440b7;;   cf.   440c7.)   “In   Carone’s  
understanding”,  they  argue,  “reason would have to be understood as perhaps only initially allied 
with spirit, but this alliance dissolves and reason comes to be allied (at least momentarily) with 
appetite   instead   […]   But   the   story   itself   hardly   makes   it   seem   as   if   Leontius   has   acted   in  
accordance with an all-things-considered judgment. Were this actually what Plato had in mind, 
the  case  would  have  to  be  explained  differently”  (209).  There  are  three  points  to  make  in  response  
to their argument. First, while they are certainly correct that the story does not make it seem as if 
Leontius had acted in accordance with his rational judgment, it is not obvious that this omission 
tells in their favor. For it could just as easily be said that the story does not make it seem as if 
Leontius had acted contrary to a rational judgment. Given that Socrates avoids discussing 
Leontius’  reasoning  entirely,  it  is  not  clear  why  the  case  ‘would  have  to  be  explained  differently’  
if Plato had understood the case as Carone suggests. Moreover, given the emphasis throughout 
the text on the ways in which reasoning is corrupted by appetites, it is not clear why, in the 
absence   of   any   clear   indication   about   the   status   of   Leontius’   reasoning,   the   burden   of   proof  
should be on Carone, rather than on those who oppose her. Second, it is not necessarily true that 
reason must either judge that it is all-things-considered best to gaze at corpses or judge that it is 
all-things-considered best to abstain from doing so. It is also possible that it simply does not 
judge at all,  at  least  temporarily.  In  other  words,  it  is  possible  that  the  full  account  of  Leontius’  
case   (and  at   least   some  other  cases   in  which  appetites   ‘force’  us   to   act)   is   something   like   this:  
Leontius initially judges that he should not gaze at corpses, and his reasoning and spirit are 
initially aligned in resisting his desire to do so. Under the influence of his appetites, however, his 
judgment becomes clouded and blocked from his mind, such that, at least at the moment of his 
action, Leontius does not hold any rational judgment at all about the particular act of corpse-
gazing in question. Given that Socrates has just provided an account of how correct judgments are 
‘lost’   or   ‘abandoned’   (and   perhaps   not   necessarily   ‘replaced’),   this   interpretation   is   hardly  
ungrounded. Finally, note that whatever Socrates is claiming at 440a-b is something he casually 
assumes (rather than argues for) on the basis of mundane observation (it is something that we 
‘notice’   [αἰσθανόμεθα, 440a8]). If the point he is making is one that can be readily extracted 
from everyday experience, however, then that suggests it is not intended as an important 
philosophical claim, and certainly not as a rejection of a previously argued-for position. 
Ultimately, I have no strong commitment to the readings of Leontius that Carone or I have 
offered, but I do think that those readings should be recognized as, at the very least, permitted by 
the text. 
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 I do not claim that this interpretation  of  the  Leontius  case  and  Socrates’  remarks 
at 440a-b is necessitated by the text, however. Indeed, although Plato never explicitly 
acknowledges akrasia in the Republic, it is also clear that he never explicitly rules out its 
possibility. However, and this is the crucial second conclusion that we can draw from 
Plato’s  treatment of psychic relationships in the text: even if Plato had come to accept the 
possibility of akrasia, he nonetheless seems to have thought that, as a matter of empirical 
fact, appetite tends to bring about failures of reason not by forcing individuals to act 
against their concurrently held better judgments, but rather by corrupting those 
judgments. There is nothing inconsistent about believing both that akrasia is in principle 
possible and that it rarely (or even never) actually occurs.41 Plato’s  consistent  attention  to  
preventing the vacillation and corruption of   reason’s   judgment   in   the   text,   rather   than  
akratic action, shows at least that he took the former to be the much more prevalent and 
ethically significant phenomenon. This, then, is a further reason why Plato was not 
interested in countenancing akrasia: he took it to be either an impossibility or, at most, a 
negligible anomaly. Either way, it was not worth addressing. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
There are two final issues that I would like briefly to address. The first concerns 
the spirited part of the soul, about which I have said very little in this paper. One reason 
for that is simply that the most prominent cases of putative akrasia are those involving 
appetite and appetitive desires. Socrates mentions non-rational impulses other than 
pleasure  when  he  takes  on  the  Many’s  position  in  the  Protagoras—including anger—but 
it is on pleasure that he focuses his account. If akrasia were possible at all, on Plato’s  
view, then we would expect it to be possible first and foremost in cases involving conflict 
between reason and appetite. Indeed, as we have seen, Plato thinks that rational desires 
and appetitive ones are in a unique kind of tension with each other, “as if they were on 
                                                 
41 Cf.   Price   1995:   97:   “We  might   expect   [Plato’s]   writings   to   be   rich   in   case-studies of hard 
akrasia. In fact, they contain few. We shall need to reflect why he expects reason to be more often 
suborned  than  subdued.” 
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opposite scales of a balance”.42 Despite my neglect of spirit, however, it should be noted 
that I do take the spirited part of the soul to have an important role to play in the Platonic 
account of psychic mastery and rule. Plato characterizes spirit in the Republic as  reason’s  
psychic  ‘ally’. Along with reason, it is supposed  to  ‘watch  over’ the appetitive part of the 
soul  in  order  to  make  sure  “that  it  doesn’t  become  so  big  and  strong…  that it attempts to 
enslave and rule over the other classes  it  isn’t  fitted  to  rule” (442a5-b2). I take it that one 
of   spirit’s  primary   roles   as reason’s  ally, then, is to ‘do its part’   (however   that   is   to  be  
worked out) to prevent both local and global failures of reason. Its job, in other words, is 
to make   sure   that   appetite   remains  weak,   and   appetite’s   psychic   influence  minimal,   so  
that it does not influence or corrupt the judgments of reason.43  
The second issue is that of developmentalism. The conclusions of my paper 
suggest that there is much more continuity between the moral psychology of the 
Protagoras and that of the Republic than has typically been thought. To begin with, it is 
not   clear   that   Plato’s   attitude   toward   akrasia underwent the sharp reversal that many 
versions of the prevalent interpretation allege. In the Protagoras Socrates concludes that 
all putative cases of akrasia are really just cases of fluctuating judgment and ignorance. 
Under the influence of our appetites and the Power of Appearances, he explains, 
immediate pleasures appear bigger and more intense than long-term ones, and that 
appearance causes us to make mistaken judgments about the value of those competing 
pleasures. In the Republic, we have seen, Plato does not provide this kind of unequivocal 
rejection of akrasia. However, he never explicitly acknowledges the possibility akrasia 
either,  and  his  presentation  of  appetite’s  control  of reason consistently emphasizes ways 
                                                 
42 Furthermore, although local failures of reason due to the influence of the spirited part of the 
soul—most obviously, cases involving impetuous anger—are   no   doubt   possible   on   Plato’s  
account, it is generally much easier to reconcile such cases with a denial of the possibility of 
akrasia. For cases of impetuous anger characteristically involve acting in haste, which suggests 
that the individual might act before making a rational judgment about what she ought to do. If 
that is the case, then in acting that way she does not act contrary to a concurrently held rational 
judgment. Cf. the analyses of impetuous or spirited anger offered at Laws 866d-867c and in 
Aristotle (EN 1149a24-1150a8). I discuss the former in Wilburn (2012) 
43 I  provide  an  analysis  of  the  spirited  part’s  psychological  role  in  the  Republic, and in particular 
its function in the virtue of courage, in Wilburn (forthcoming). 
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in which reasoning is destabilized or corrupted, rather than forcibly overcome. 44 
Certainly it should be clear that, whatever changes of mind Plato may or may not have 
had about the issue of akrasia following the Protagoras, those changes of mind were not 
the motivation for the Republic’s  tripartite  account  of  the  soul.  Plato’s  use  of  that  theory  
shows that its purpose is to provide the resources to describe and evaluate various kinds 
of psychic mastery and rule, and to promote virtuous psychic constitutions. This is 
exactly what we should expect the significance of tripartition to be, given that the 
Republic’s  answers  to  its  two  central  questions—What is justice? and Why should we be 
just?—crucially rely on the notion of psychic rule in a partitioned soul. 
Nor, however, should we think that Republic’s   lack of interest in explaining 
akrasia represents   a   shift   in   Plato’s   priorities.   In the Protagoras, the emphasis of 
Socrates’  argument  against   the  many   is  overwhelmingly  on  affirming   the  supremacy  of  
knowledge. It is not until 358b, in fact, after Socrates has completed his argument against 
the many, that he concludes that no one acts contrary to what he knows or believes to be 
best (and thereby denies the possibility of akrasia entirely).45  Up until that point, his 
focus   is   exclusively   on   demonstrating   the   impossibility   of   acting   contrary   to   one’s  
knowledge, without commenting directly on whether it is possible to act contrary to mere 
belief. When he finally does draw that conclusion, it has the status of an afterthought. 
                                                 
44 Much of the debate concerning whether Plato changes his view about akrasia in the Republic 
has  been  focused  on  the  question  whether  appetites  are  ‘good-dependent’  or  ‘good-independent’  
in the Republic—that is, whether or not they involve, or are essentially responsive to, judgments 
about  goodness.  Prominent  in  many  accounts  that  advocate  the  ‘prevalent  view’  is   the  idea  that  
whereas earlier dialogues like the Protagoras take all desires to be good-dependent, the Republic 
accepts (at 437d ff.) that at least some desires are good-independent—Penner  calls  these  ‘blind’  
desires—and it is those good-independent desires that allow for the possibility of akratic action. 
This is the view that is advocated, for example, in the accounts of Gosling 1990: 21; Irwin 1997: 
191-2; Penner 1971: 103-11 and 1990: 49-61; and Reeve 1988: 134-5. As a result, those who 
oppose developmentalism have tended to take the approach of denying that the Republic 
recognizes the existence of good-independent desires (often, in part, by appealing to Rep. 505d-
e). This is the approach found in Carone 2001; Morris 2006; and Singpurwalla 2006: 256, n. 16. 
(There are some who fall outside of this pattern, however, e.g. Gardner 2002: 200-1 and Shields 
2007: 76. Gardner takes appetites to be good-dependent both before and in the Republic, but he is 
a developmentalist on other grounds. Shields accepts the shift from good-dependence to good-
independence but rejects developmentalism.) Nothing in my interpretation, however, turns on the 
good-dependent or –independent status of the appetites. My approach to rejecting sharp 
developmentalism is thus distinct from those adopted by other prominent anti-developmentalist 
accounts. 
45 οἰόμενος, 358b7. Cf. 358c7, 358d1, 358e5, and 359d2. 
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Indeed,  the  purpose  of  Socrates’  discussion  is  to  point  out  that,  contrary  to  what  the  many  
believe, they do not know what is good for them when they do what is bad for them. For 
Plato, this has a double meaning: they are ignorant because they do not know (as they 
think they do), at the time that they choose it, that the pleasure they are choosing is less 
than the pleasure they are forfeiting; and furthermore, they are ignorant because they do 
not know that pleasure is not really the criterion of goodness. Whereas the former point 
is what the many take away from the discussion, the latter point is the one that matters to 
Plato. The many have corrupt values under the influence of their appetites—they are 
‘ruled   by   pleasure’  whether they resist temptation or not—and that is their real moral 
affliction.46 This is precisely the moral psychological insight that is explored by the 
Republic, through its methodical examination  of  the  soul’s  structure and the relationships 
of rule among its parts. The tripartite psychology of the later dialogue allows Plato to 
vindicate and explain the Protagoras’  central  claims  that  knowledge  is  the  sort  of  thing  
that   ‘rules’   in   the   soul,   and   that   all   cases  of  wrongdoing   involve   ignorance  or  unstable  
judgment about what is best. The Republic does not repudiate the moral psychology of 
the Protagoras, then, but rather explores and elaborates on it.47 
Josh Wilburn 
Wayne State University 
 
 
                                                 
46 Other dialogues that have sometimes been taken to be concerned with akrasia are, I think, 
similarly unconcerned with it upon closer examination. At Gorgias 491d ff., for example, 
Socrates asks Callicles whether it is necessary for superior individuals to ‘rule  themselves’.  When  
asked  what  he  means,  Socrates   responds,   “Just  what   the  many  mean:  being  moderate   and   self-
controlled,   ruling   the   pleasures   and   appetites   within   oneself”   (ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα 
ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῆ αὺτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἄρχοντα τῶν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, 
491d10-e1).   I   think   there   is   much   to   be   said   about  what   is   going   in   Socrates’   exchange   with  
Callicles in the Gorgias, but this much, at least, is clear: the psychic condition to which Socrates 
opposes self-control and rule over one’s  appetites  is  not  akrasia, but rather deliberate, licentious 
self-indulgence (ἀκολασία) of the sort that Callicles endorses. I have also argued in Wilburn 
2013 that the Laws is similarly unconcerned with akrasia, despite how many interpreters have 
read 644d-645b, where the Athenian Visitor likens human beings to ‘divine  puppets’ as a way of 
illuminating the notion of  being  ‘stronger’  or ‘weaker’ than oneself. 
47 For their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper, I would like to thank Nicholas 
Smith   and   the   audience   at   the   International   Plato   Society’s   2012   conference   on   Plato’s  Moral  
Psychology at the University of Michigan. 
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